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Abstract
Wealthier people generally hold a larger part of their savings in risky
assets. Using the US Survey of Consumer Finances, I show that wealthier
households also have a higher portfolio share of foreign assets. This relative
home bias of the poor does not seem to be explained by xed participation
costs alone, as the portfolio share of foreign assets increases with nan-
cial wealth even among participants in foreign asset markets. This paper
shows how both biases of poorer agents' portfolios, towards safe and home
assets, can arise in a simple 2 country economy with income and port-
folio heterogeneity. Poor investors are naturally biased against domestic
equity when wages and capital returns are positively correlated, making
equity a bad hedge against uctuations in labour income relative to bonds.
Moreover poor investors prefer home to foreign bonds if equilibrium terms
of trade movements systematically lead to a fall in the purchasing power
of domestic assets in periods of high wages. I show that this is likely to
be the case if aggregate supply shocks at home are more important than
abroad. Finally, the model shows that aggregate home bias in the country
portfolio implies relative home bias of the poor and vice versa.
JEL Classication Codes: F36, G11, E21, D11, D31
Keywords: Heterogeneous Agents, Home Bias, Inequality, International Asset
Diversication, Portfolio Choice
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11 Introduction
It is well-documented that household portfolios become more diversied as
wealth increases. Campbell (2006) and Guiso et al. (2003), for example, show
that poor households are less likely to invest in risky assets. Equally, many au-
thors have found that aggregate country-portfolios have surprisingly low shares
of foreign assets, the so-called "home bias in portfolios puzzle" (see Lewis, 1997,
for a summary of this literature). But little attention has been devoted to the
composition of individual household portfolios between domestic and foreign
assets, and its relationship with individual wealth. In the empirical part of this
paper, I study the US survey of consumer nances (SCF) and show that wealth-
ier investors also seem to invest on average a higher share of their portfolio in
foreign assets than investors with lower nancial wealth.
A prominent explanation for this bias of poorer investors towards safe and home
assets are xed costs of participating in the markets for risky and foreign as-
sets. Fixed costs, however, cannot explain the relative home bias of the poor
among participants in foreign asset markets, for whom the xed cost is sunk.
In the theoretical part of the paper, I show that without xed costs, agents
with lower nancial wealth optimally have a higher portfolio share of assets
that hedge against uctuations in their future income. And I present an envi-
ronment where home assets are better income hedges than foreign assets. This
is because in equilibrium, a positive shock to aggregate home output increases
the relative price of foreign goods, and thus reduces the real payos of home
bonds. Therefore, if individual real incomes comove more strongly with home
than foreign output, home bonds provide a hedge against uctuations in non-
diversiable individual income risk. Wealthy investors, whose future income is
less dependent on endowments, care less about this hedging property than poor
investors. Therefore, equilibrium portfolios vary across the wealth distribution
and poorer investors tend to have a stronger home bias than rich investors.
Moreover, this result implies a strong link between the relative home bias of
poor agents and home bias of the aggregate country portfolio: the aggregate
country portfolio exhibits home bias if and only if there is relative home bias
of the poor.
The intuition for these results has similarities to Baxter and Jermann (1997)
who show that with income from non-marketable human capital, the optimal
portfolio of assets consists of two sub-portfolios, one completely diversied, the
other designed to hedge against volatility of human capital returns. I show that
2the hedging portfolio can be dominated by safe domestic assets. And its impor-
tance relative to the diversied part of the portfolio declines with increases in
total wealth. To derive the results, I consider a two country model with incom-
plete markets and heterogeneous consumers that receive an uncertain amount
of a country-specic endowment good every period. I derive analytical portfolio
shares by assuming (as Cole and Obstfeld, 1991) that preferences over domes-
tic and foreign goods are unit-elastic and identical across countries and agents.
This implies that terms of trade depend only on aggregate country endowments
each period.
My paper combines three strands of literature. First, from studies of house-
hold nances I take the stylised fact that wealthier individuals have riskier and
more diversied portfolios. Using the 2004 wave of the survey of consumer
nances, I illustrate how the portfolio share of foreign assets is increasing in in-
vestor wealth. Second, I adopt the idea that general equilibrium terms of trade
movements can signicantly change the optimal portfolios obtained in partial
equilibrium (cf. Lewis, 1997, for a survey, or more recently Obstfeld and Ro-
go, 2000, van Wincoop and Warnock, 2006, Heathcote and Perri, 2007). Like
Baxter and Jermann (1997) I also include non-marketable human capital, but
add an idiosyncratic component to its returns. I show that the implications for
the composition of individual portfolios across the wealth distribution are con-
sistent with the observed facts. Third, I extend heterogeneous agents models
to the open economy.
2 Portfolios across the wealth distribution: evidence
from the 2004 SCF
Wealthier and more educated people are more likely to invest in risky assets.
This is well-documented for the US (see for example Campbell, 2006, for a re-
view and an illustration using the 2001 SCF data) and a number of European
countries (see Guiso et al, 2003, and Carroll, 2002).
Equally, it is well-known that average country portfolios have surprisingly low
shares of foreign assets - the "home bias in portfolios puzzle". This has been
interpreted as a consequence of a more general "local bias" of household port-
folios, which overweigh local, regional, and national assets (see e.g. Campbell
2006). But compared to the portfolio shares of risky assets in general, or of do-
mestic equity more in particular, there is very little evidence on the home bias
3of individual households and its determinants. Campbell et al (2006) conclude
for the case of Sweden that international diversication possibilities exist, but
are usually exploited only by wealthier individuals, who have a higher share of
investments in mutual funds (with an average portfolio share of 25 percent for
foreign assets). However, they provide no evidence on direct holdings of foreign
assets.
To document the evolution of foreign asset holdings across the wealth distribu-
tion, I examine the 2004 wave of the US survey of consumer nances (SCF).
This survey includes information on the US Dollar value of households' hold-
ings of "bonds issued by foreign governments or companies" and "stock in a
company headquartered outside of the United States".1 In order to control for
indirect holdings of foreign assets, I include a measure of foreign assets held via
mutual funds.2 The SCF includes data on households' investments in several
broad categories of mutual funds. I derive a measure of total foreign asset hold-
ings by summing to individuals' direct investments in foreign equity and bonds
the value of their mutual fund shares in US equity, bond and combination funds
multiplied by the average portfolio weight of foreign bonds and equity in each
type of fund.3 Figure 1 plots the resulting foreign asset portfolio shares (aver-
aged within every decile of the nancial wealth distribution to reduce noise) as
1Question codes x7638 and x7641. An obvious problem of this measure is that it does not
refer to non-dollar assets, but to assets issued by foreign issuers, in foreign currency and US
dollars.
2In other words, I do not consider pension funds. One reason for this is that individuals'
decisions on pension fund investment are taken under a very dierent set of constraints than
other investment decisions. Also, most shares in pension funds are not actively managed as a
part of regular portfolio decisions. However, both these arguments do not apply to individual
mutual fund investments.
3To my knowledge, these average portfolio shares of mutual funds are not readily available
from published sources. But Morningstar kindly provided data on portfolio shares of non-
US assets for more than 4700 US mutual funds, not including funds of funds. From this I
calculated weighted averages for portfolio shares of foreign bonds and equity for the three
categories of funds for the year 2003. Since equity (bond) funds seem to often not report zero
foreign bond (equity) holdings, I made an adjustment by setting missing observations to zero
for all funds that reported portfolio shares summing to at least 99.5 percent. The resulting
sample included around 2800 observations for shares of international equity and slightly less
for bonds. Using this sample, the average US equity mutual fund invested 17.1 percent in
foreign shares, while the average bond fund (disregarding funds of government / municipal
bonds) invested 3.6 percent abroad. Combination funds invested on average 10.7 percent in
non-US assets.
4a function of individual nancial wealth.4 The gure shows that the portfolio
shares of foreign assets are monotonically increasing across deciles of the nan-
cial wealth distribution. So richer households seem to have lower home bias on
average.5
[Figure 1 somewhere here.]
The evidence presented in Figure 1, however, raises several questions. First,
under- or misreporting of foreign assets by households, and the use of average
mutual fund portfolios might introduce measurement error in foreign assets.
An appendix argues that this is in fact likely to bias any positive relationship
between portfolio shares and nancial wealth towards zero. This is because
o-shore investments for tax evasion are likely to make underreporting more
severe for foreign assets, and average mutual fund portfolio shares are likely
to under-represent the foreign asset holdings by wealthy households' if these
systematically choose mutual funds with higher foreign exposure. A second
question is wether the rise in average portfolio shares across the wealth distri-
bution could merely be due to a higher participation rate of wealthy individuals
in the foreign asset market, rather than a rise in individual portfolio shares of
participants as they become richer. One factor that could cause such a pat-
tern are xed costs of entering sophisticated nancial markets. An appendix
presents a simple model that shows that this implies a non-linear relationship
between nancial wealth and participation, in the form of a threshold value of
assets below which individuals do not hold any foreign assets. Optimal port-
folios above the threshold value, however, would not be aected by sunk xed
costs. Thus, any variation in portfolio shares above the threshold value has to
be attributed to other factors.
4Both the deciles and the averages take account of the fact that the SCF oversamples
parts of the population, by applying the weights suggested by Kennickell (1999), and the
multiple imputation procedure used for the SCF. This is because, to eliminate inconsistencies
and missing values, the SCF imputes some values from the other information provided by a
household. However, rather than simply reporting one best guess for the imputed values, the
SCF provides 5 draws per observation from the distribution of the missing values conditional
on observables.
5The portfolio shares of foreign assets are low relative to those calculated from aggregate
US data. But keep in mind that the SCF measure of nancial wealth, the denominator of the
ratio, includes a large range of assets such as insurance contracts, liquid retirement funds, etc.,
while the numerator only considers bonds and stocks held directly and via mutual funds. Also,
the aggregate shares of foreign assets in the country portfolio cannot directly be read from
the graph. The ratios of foreign to total assets of the implied weighted aggregate portfolio are
2.75, 4.08, 3.99 percent for bonds, equities and their total respectively.
5Finally, one might suspect that nancial wealth simply captures the eects of
other important variables, such as education, age, or income, on portfolios. In
this case we would expect an analysis that controls for these variables to yield
signicantly dierent results.
To answer the last two questions, I perform a more formal econometric analy-
sis. I estimate jointly the probability of participation and the optimal portfolio
share of participants with the Heckman (1979) method, conditioning on other
variables that were found to be important for portfolio decisions of individuals








H = a + b1AGE + b2COL + b3FIN2 + b4FIN3 + b5FIN4 + 2 (2)
Here, SHARE is the portfolio share of foreign assets, FIN is the SCF denition
of gross nancial wealth and INCOME is the sum of salaries, wages and income
or losses from a professional practice, business, limited partnership, or farm-
ing. H is an indicator variable that captures the probability of participation in
foreign asset markets. This probability is a function of age, a dummy variable
"COL" that equals 1 when the household head holds a college degree, and a set
of dummies FINx that capture nancial wealth, taking the value 1 when total
nancial assets of the household fall in the (weight-adjusted) xth quartile. Only
when H is above a threshold, normalised to 0, agents participate in foreign asset
markets and we observe the variable SHARE, their portfolio share of foreign
assets. Conditional on participation the portfolio share is a function of income
and nancial wealth. The errors 1 and 2 are assumed to follow a joint normal
distribution. The equations are estimated jointly with full maximum-likelihood
adjusted for sampling weights. Identication is achieved by restricting the ef-
fects of nancial wealth to be linear in logs in (1), and constant within quartiles
in (2), which I take to be a proxy for dierent possible participation thresholds.6
Results are reported in table 1, where numbers in italics are standard errors.7
6I also estimated an alternative specication that included income quartiles in the par-
ticipation equation. While, in the presence of xed costs of entering foreign asset markets,
we would expect nancial wealth to determine the participation threshold and not income,
current income could act as a proxy for future nancial wealth. However, the income quartile
dummies turned out to be insignicant, so I excluded them from the nal specication.
7Again, an additional complication is the use in the SCF of multiple imputations for
missing values. To account for this, I estimate the same model for each of the 5 im-
6[Table 1 somewhere here.]
The eect of nancial wealth is signicant (at the 1 percent level) in both equa-
tions. Ceteris paribus, individuals in the bottom quartile of the nancial wealth
distribution are least likely to invest in foreign assets. But after a jump in the
likelihood of participation between the rst and second quartile, moving further
up the wealth distribution has much smaller, and non-monotonous eects. This
is in line with a threshold value of assets beyond which a rise in wealth does not
systematically raise the probability of participation. However, higher nancial
wealth increases signicantly the portfolio share of participants in equation (1),
which cannot be attributed to xed costs. The eect of age on the probability
of participation is insignicant, but college graduates have on average a higher
probability of investing in foreign assets. Finally, for participants the eect of
rising income on the portfolio share of foreign assets is insignicant.
This section has shown that individual portfolio shares of foreign assets in-
crease with nancial wealth. There is a signicant jump in the probability of
participation in foreign asset markets between the rst and second nancial
wealth quartiles, consistent with xed participation costs. But xed costs can-
not explain the signicant positive relationship between portfolio shares and
nancial wealth for participants. The next section presents a simple model of
the international economy, where general equilibrium movements in the relative
price of home and foreign goods can make home assets better hedges against
income uctuations, and thus lead to the observed pattern of portfolios: poor
individuals have a stronger taste for home bonds as in general equilibrium their
real payos hedge against volatile endowments, which are their dominant source
of income.
3 A 2 country heterogeneous agents endowment econ-
omy
I consider an economy with 2 countries, home (H) and foreign (F). In each
country there is a large number of agents with unit mass. Individual agents
are indexed by h, f at home and abroad respectively. They live for two periods,
plicates separately and then aggregate the estimation results. For the coecients and
standard errors reported in Table 1, I use the formulae suggested in the SCF codebook
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/PUBS/oss/oss2/2004/codebk2004.txt). For the chi
2 value I
report a simple average of the following individual values: 75.66, 70.18, 81.42, 69.49, 43.22.
7and receive endowments of a country-specic perishable good H or F.
Agents' preferences are described by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tion that is homogeneous across agents and countries, with constant relative
risk aversion over sequences of a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of country-specic
goods as for example in Cole and Obstfeld (1991)











where ck;I denotes consumption by agent k of good I and k 2 fh;fg. More
generally, notation is as follows: Capital letters H,F denote country-specic
variables or goods, small letters h,f denote individual variables that can vary
across agents of country H,F. First subscripts denote agents or countries, sec-
ond subscripts goods. Second period values of a variable x are denoted as x',
its distribution as 	x.
Heterogeneity and uncertainty
Heterogeneity in our economy comes from dierences in endowments. More
precisely, agents in country K receive individual endowments k;0
k of their spe-
cic good in period 1 and 2 respectively. Initial endowments k are known
at the beginning of period 1 before agents choose consumption and portfolios.
Income inequality in country K is summarised by the distribution of period 1
endowments across agents 	
K, which is common knowledge.
0
k, the endowment of individual k in period 2, is the product of two terms:
an "individual endowment share" e0





k  Y 0
K (6)
"Idiosyncratic risk" is given by the probability distribution of e0
k, the period 2
endowment shares of individual k, which I denote 	e0
k . For simplicity I assume
that second period endowments are i.i.d. across agents and independent of all




k = 1 - expected period 2 individ-
ual endowment is 1. By the iid assumption and the law of large numbers this
means the sum of realised endowment shares is always 1 and aggregate period
2 output in country K simply equals Y 0
K.8
8For the derivation of a law of large numbers for continuum economies, see Uhlig (1996).
8"Aggregate risk" is summarized by the probability distribution of Y 0
H and Y 0
F,
the aggregate endowments in period 2, denoted 	Y 0
H ;	Y 0
F . I assume that these
are independent of individual random variables, but possibly correlated among
each other.









F)0; ), where a hat denotes natural loga-
rithms b z = ln(z) and  is a matrix with diagonal entries Veh;Vef;VH;VF whose
only o diagonal entry is CovHF, the covariance of aggregate log-endowments.
Incomplete asset markets and borrowing constraints
I impose the simplest structure of asset markets that allows me to analyse two
kinds of trade-os in optimal portfolios: the choice between safe and risky as-
sets on the one hand, and between home and foreign assets on the other.
Like Hugget (1993), agents trade "IOUs" that are in zero net supply and de-
nominated in domestic goods. These are "safe" assets in the sense that for 1
unit of H goods invested today, IOUs in H always pay Rb
H units of good H
next period (where "b" stands for "bonds"). Equivalently, foreign IOUs pay
Rb
F units of F goods.
In contrast to Hugget's (1993) economy, however, agents can also trade shares in
national mutual funds, and are allowed to buy shares and IOUs from foreigners.
Shares are also in zero net supply, and risky in the sense that their payos are
proportional to the stochastic aggregate endowment. Thus the return on home
shares is Rs
HY 0
H per unit of H goods invested, equivalently for F. One obvious
implication of the exogenous incompleteness of asset markets is that individual
claims to future endowments are non-tradable, and that the resulting risk thus
is non-diversiable.
I denote h's holdings of home and foreign IOUs by ab
h;H and ab
h;F respectively,
and her holdings of shares by as
h;H and as
h;F. Asset quantities are denoted in




h;H units of H IOUs and
ab
h;F
p units of F IOUs. I denote the vector of returns
as R, the vectors of assets held by individuals in H, F as ah;af, and the total
value, in terms of their domestic good, of their assets at the end of period 1 as
ah;af.
I assume both IOUs and shares have zero default probability. Consistent with
this, agents can credibly promise to repay only in units of their income - so
borrowing contracts are always written in the endowment good of the issuer.
This means agents can issue only domestic assets, but invest both at home
9and abroad. One consequence of the no-default assumption are individual bor-
rowing constraints: agents in country K can only issue IOUs and mutual fund
shares up to maximum amounts Bb
K;Bs
K. The borrowing limits play no further
role in the discussion as I concentrate on interior portfolios.9
The Household's problem
A typical home Household h maximises expected lifetime utility by choosing in
period 1 consumption and a vector of assets ah subject to her budget constraint,
borrowing constraints for domestic assets and the non-negativity of foreign as-
set holdings, taking as given the relative price of home goods (in units of the











































H; for i 2 fb;sg
a
j
h;F  0; for j 2 fb;sg
0
h = e0Y 0
H
where pH =  (1   ) (1 )p1  is the home consumption price index. The
problem of a typical foreign household is symmetric.





F;p0. Thus, to solve her problem, h needs to know
the distribution of the equilibrium relative price next period, as this determines
the real value of her assets and endowments. But in equilibrium, p0 potentially
depends on the demand functions of all individual agents, and thus on the joint
9The "natural" limit to total borrowing in riskless assets would equal the present discounted
value of minimum future income BK = bK
0
K;min
R , which is the highest amount agents can
repay for sure. But with log-normal endowments there is a positive probability of having
endowment realisations arbitrarily close to 0, such that this formulation does not lead to
a non-zero borrowing limit. The problem can be avoided by introducing a positive non-
stochastic minimum endowment level for all agents in a country. This can be chosen such that




K above. As I concentrate





10distribution of endowments and the distribution of equilibrium asset holdings
at the end of period 1.
Note also that in (7), households can be constrained by any combination of the
borrowing limits on assets, and in most equilibria there will be some constrained
households. In the analysis of portfolios, I concentrate on unconstrained house-
holds with interior portfolios. For simplicity, I specify the vector of assets in
two dierent ways, allowing either cross-border trade in equity or in IOUs.
4 Competitive equilibrium and the terms of trade
This section denes a competitive equilibrium and discusses the properties of
the equilibrium terms of trade, before the following section looks at portfolios.
An appendix discusses existence and uniqueness.
4.1 Denition of Competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is
1. A Consumption Allocation:




k;J is a random variable depending on the
realisation of period 2 uncertainty.
2. A set of Portfolios:
For every agent k, a vector ak specifying holdings of all assets in the
economy at the end of period 1.10
3. A Price System, consisting of
 p;p0, the relative prices of F goods in terms of H goods in period 1
and 2, where p0 is a random variable with distribution 	p0
.
 R, the vector of asset returns
such that
1. Agents allocate their funds optimally across goods in period 2 given a
particular realisation p0.
10Summed across all agents individual quantities imply an Aggregate consumption al-













well as a Country portfolio of gross and net asset holdings, and a Net asset position once
net holdings of all assets in a country are summed at period 1 prices.
112. the allocation solves every household's problem (7) in period 1 given a
relative price p, a distribution 	p0




ch;Hdh + cf;Hdf = YH;
R








f;Jdf = 0; 8 i 2 fb;sg; J 2 fH;Fg (each
asset is in zero net supply)
4. The distribution of the future relative price 	p0
is consistent with the




F, and individual asset
holdings at the end of period 1.
I call a competitive equilibrium "symmetric" if all home and foreign distribu-
tions are identical, and  = 1
2.
Note that, in order to determine the distribution of relative prices 	p0
that
aects portfolio decisions, agents need to map today's distribution of endow-
ments into tomorrow's excess demand functions via individual savings decisions
and the joint law of motion of aggregate and individual endowments.11 As the
next section shows, the assumption of identical homothetic preferences for all
agents in a particular country implies that a country's demand for goods only
depends on the relative price and aggregate savings and endowment, not indi-
vidual savings or endowments. But individual uncertainty and heterogeneity
still matter for aggregate savings and net asset positions. Identical preferences
across countries ensure that even the aggregate net asset positions do not matter
for excess demands, so aggregate endowments tomorrow completely determine
aggregate demand for goods and thus market-clearing prices.
4.2 Equilibrium terms of trade movements
An important consequence of the identical homothetic preferences across goods
is that the optimal expenditure shares are identical for all agents independent
of endowment income. Since assets are in zero net supply, this implies that
excess demands are independent of the heterogeneity in the economy. It follows
11This is similar to the recursive framework with capital accumulation presented by Krusell
and Smith (1998), where agents need to know the law of motion for the joint distribution of in-
dividual asset holdings and (aggregate and idiosyncratic) shocks, as this determines aggregate
savings and thus the returns to capital tomorrow.
12from this that aggregate endowments Yh;Yf map directly into a market clearing











As a consequence of the unit-elasticity of the consumption basket, for consumers
with constant relative risk aversion, these equilibrium price movements yield
complete insurance against country-endowment shocks: prices move against
endowments to optimally spread risk across countries. So with representative
agents, there is no incentive for asset trade (see Cole and Obstfeld (1991)).
However, in an environment with heterogeneity in incomes, agents do have in-
centives to trade assets to smooth consumption and engage in precautionary
savings. Moreover, their asset portfolios will generally depend on their period
1 income, which, given the assumption of i.i.d. period 2 endowments, maps
monotonically into lifetime wealth.
A feature of unit-elastic demand for goods closely related to the perfect in-
surance result is that claims to country-endowments, or national mutual fund


















where I set the period 1 relative price of goods to 1 for simplicity. So with
international trade in shares agents are always indierent between home and
12To see this, denote by sh(sf) agents' total expenditure in terms of H (F) goods in any
period. Cobb-Douglas preferences imply constant budget shares, so optimality requires




cf;H = psf; cf;F = (1   )sf (9)
where sk denotes expenditure of agent k (endowments minus net asset investment) in domestic
goods. When agents spend ah, af units of their endowment good on assets, the excess
demand for H goods in the rst period is:
Z
(h   ah)dh +
Z
p(f   af)df = YH (10)
Zero net assets implies that individual asset holdings sum to 0 across countries once expressed




pafdf = 0 (11)




pfdf = YH + pYF = YH (12)
13foreign mutual fund shares. In this sense, the equilibrium portfolio is never
unique with international trade in shares. Also, there may be two equilibria with
high and low rates of interest in some cases. An appendix discusses conditions
for uniqueness and existence of equilibrium.
5 Optimal portfolios
I now derive the optimal asset allocation when domestic agents can invest in
assets issued abroad. Asset holdings dier across individuals for 2 reasons: rst,
although the distributions of their future endowment income are the same (due
to the i.i.d. assumption), domestic agents dier in current income. To smooth
consumption, richer agents, with higher current income, save more than poorer
agents. Second, poor agents, with low or negative savings, have tomorrow's
consumption determined largely by tomorrow's endowment income. Thus, they
prefer assets that are good hedges against uctuations of endowment income,
to limit consumption volatility. One main result of this paper is that, due to
terms of trade movements, home IOUs can be better hedges against income risk
than foreign assets or mutual fund shares. Richer agents, whose consumption
is mainly determined by asset returns, care relatively less about this hedging,
and thus have a lower portfolio share of home IOUs.
For the results in this section, the distinction between wealth portfolios and
nancial portfolios is important (see also Campbell 2007, section 2.4). Wealth
portfolio shares are simply percentages of total wealth, the sum of nancial
assets and the present value of future endowment income. Since total wealth is
strictly positive for all individuals, wealth portfolio shares are always bounded
and sum to 1. Also, this section shows that wealth portfolios are approximately
the sum of 2 sub-portfolios: rst, a "hedge portfolio", which is the same for
all individuals, designed to optimally sell o individual income risk. And sec-
ond, a "balanced portfolio", determined only by the joint distribution of asset
returns, that invests the proceeds of this sale and additional savings, making
it proportional to total wealth. Thus, for "wealth poor" individuals with low
total wealth, the hedge portfolio always dominates, leading to "home bias" in
their asset allocation, when home IOUs are better income hedges.
More usually, however, the term portfolio refers to nancial portfolios, a dif-
ference that becomes important when talking about portfolio shares. Financial
portfolio shares are generally dened as percentages of gross nancial assets.
In order to have nancial portfolio shares that are positive and bounded, the
14nance literature often imposes a no-short-selling constraint for assets. In my
general equilibrium framework, on the other hand, agents can short-sell domes-
tic assets. But in the discussion of nancial portfolios, I concentrate on net
savers, who have well-dened nancial portfolio shares. Portfolios of poor net
savers, with a low but positive net nancial asset position and thus a signi-
cant level of total wealth, are a combination of the hedge and balanced portfolio.
Importantly, they typically feature positive investment in only 1 asset that has
superior combined hedging and return properties, and whose nancial portfolio
share is 1 (or higher if the alternative asset is short-sold). As nancial (and thus
total) wealth rises, nancial portfolio shares converge as before to the balanced
portfolio. Wether nancial portfolio shares have home bias relative to individ-
uals with higher savings thus depends not only on hedging properties, but also
on the joint distribution of returns, which determines the balanced portfolio.
For simplicity this section considers two binary portfolio problems: rst, to
show how the importance of hedging against income risk declines with wealth,
I analyse portfolio decisions between domestic IOUs and mutual fund shares.
There, agents can easily hedge future income uctuations by selling shares and
investing the proceeds, plus any other nancial wealth they hold, in a balanced
portfolio. As agents get richer portfolios become more diversied as the bal-
anced investment portfolio dominates the hedging sub-portfolio. Second, I show
how this eect can lead to home bias of the poor when agents trade domestic
and foreign IOUs. Propositions 1 and 2 characterise wealth portfolios including
endowment wealth. Proposition 3 considers nancial portfolios across home
and foreign IOUs.
Since real payos to home and foreign mutual fund shares are always equalised
by equilibrium terms of trade movements, in this section I call both of them
shares in an "international mutual fund". This allows me to drop superscripts
on returns and asset quantities in this section: returns on home and foreign
IOUs are from now on simply denoted as RH;RF, those on shares as RS, and
h's corresponding asset holdings as ah;H;ah;F;ah;S.
5.1 The bias of the poor against risky assets
To show how hedging against non-diversiable income risk aects the portfolios
of the poor dierently, this section briey looks at portfolio decisions between
domestic bonds and (international) mutual fund shares. The "safe asset bias"
of investors with lower nancial wealth ("poorer investors") arises because in-
dividual real endowments (e0
hY 0
H Y 01 
F ) and real share returns (rsY 0
H Y 01 
F ) co-
15move in exactly the same way with aggregate endowments. To hedge against
endowment risk, investors thus simply take a short position in mutual funds
equal to their endowment wealth. The proceeds, and any net nancial wealth,
are invested in a balanced portfolio of bonds and shares. For poor investors,
the hedge eect dominates portfolio composition. For rich investors with high
nancial wealth, the balanced portfolio of positive investments in bonds and
shares dominates the short position in the hedge portfolio.
Proposition 1: Portfolio weight of risky assets
Both wealth and nancial portfolio shares of mutual funds increase along the
wealth distribution.
Proof of proposition 1
h agents solve their problem (7) by choosing holdings of IOUs (ah;H) and in-
ternational mutual fund shares (ah;S) subject to ah;H  Bb
H;ah;S  Bs
H.
Given log-normality of the returns, a log-linear approximation to the arbitrage
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yields the wealth portfolio shares as a function of expected returns and the
variance-covariance-structure of aggregate endowments
g ah;H =
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where a tilde denotes ratios with respect to total wealth e0
hYH + ah, rs is the
inverse of the share price and yI denote growth rates.
According to equation (16), the wealth portfolio share of domestic IOUs g ah;H
is independent of endowment wealth. The share of mutual funds in the wealth
portfolio g ah;S, on the other hand, is the sum of two terms: the rst term in
brackets in equation (17) reects the balanced sub-portfolio independent of en-
dowment income, the counterpart of the constant bond portfolio share. The
positions of this balanced portfolio are more responsive to return dierentials
(adjusted for average growth in endowments) when return dierentials are less
volatile or investors less risk averse. The second term in the expression for the
portfolio share of mutual funds (17) reects a sub-portfolio that hedges against
endowment risk by taking a short position in shares of equal magnitude as en-
dowment wealth. As a fraction of total wealth, this hedging term becomes less
16important as agents become richer and (constant) endowment wealth declines
relative to total wealth, i.e. as e e0
h decreases. Multiplying equation (17) through
by the ratio of asset to total wealth
ah
ah+e gives the same result for nancial
portfolio shares.
This result is similar to that obtained by Baxter and Jermann (1997), who
show that the optimal portfolio of a representative agent can be split in the
sum of a diversied portfolio and one that hedges against endowment risk. In
my framework with heterogeneous endowments, this eect is more important
for poorer agents whose balanced investment portfolio is smaller.
5.2 The Home Bias of the poor
I now look at optimal portfolios in the second case, when agents can, in addition
to home IOUs, also invest in foreign IOUs, but not in mutual fund shares. As
before, poor agents have stronger incentives to invest in good hedges against
the volatility of endowments. But unlike mutual fund shares, home and foreign
IOUs do not have the same hedging properties. Real payos of home IOUs
(RHY 0 1
H Y 01 
F ) are low when home endowment is high relative to foreign en-
dowment (yielding a high home consumption price). And the inverse holds for
real returns to foreign IOUs (RFY 0
H Y 0 




the other hand comoves positively with both home endowment (due to the co-
movement of individual incomes and aggregate output) and foreign endowment
(due to lower home consumption prices when aggregate foreign endowment is
high). If the volatility of real labour income is dominated by the volatility of
home endowments agents with a higher share of labour income have a stronger
preference for home IOUs that hedge against this volatility. "Wealthy" indi-
viduals on the other hand, whose future income is dominated by asset returns,
have a diversied portfolio. This leads to a relative bias of portfolios held by
poorer agents dened below.
Denition 1: Relative home bias
Agents with lower nancial wealth ("poor agents") are said to have relative
home bias, if, moving down the wealth distribution, the portfolio share of for-
eign assets declines faster than that of home assets.
Proposition 2
With international trade in IOUs, home bias of wealth portfolios changes across
17the wealth distribution. There is relative home bias of the poor, if the volatility
of aggregate home endowment is higher than that abroad.
Proof of proposition 2
Agents now choose their holdings of home and foreign IOUs, i.e. ah = ah;H;ah;F,
to solve their problem (7) subject to ah;H  Bb
H;ah;F  0. Again, solutions
to h's problem may be interior for none, one or both assets. For interior port-
folios, the same approximation as in the previous section yields the following
expressions for the portfolio share of home and foreign assets
g ah;F =
rF   yf   rH + yH
(VH + VF   2CovHF)
+
1





VH + VF   2CovHF
(18)
g ah;H =
rH   yh   rF + yf
(VH + VF   2CovHF)
+
1





VH + VF   2CovHF
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Here, both portfolio shares are the sum of a two terms: the rst reects the
balanced sub-portfolio and depends on relative mean returns, whose eect is
greater the lower risk aversion or the volatility of the return dierential; the
second term reects the hedge sub-portfolio, and is proportional to the share of
the future endowment in total wealth. Thus, portfolios dier across the wealth
distribution, as e e0
h falls with agents' total assets. More particularly, there is
relative home bias of the poor whenever the variance of aggregate home endow-
ments is larger. And interestingly, this eect becomes larger as the covariance
of aggregate endowments increases: as increasing covariance makes payos to
home and foreign IOUs more similar, the positions necessary to achieve the
optimal hedge become more extreme.
This result conrms our intuition that agents with lower nancial wealth have
stronger incentives to hedge against the main source of real endowment volatil-
ity, which is simply the more volatile aggregate endowment.
[Figures 2 to 4 somewhere below here.]
Does relative home bias in wealth portfolios imply relative home bias in nan-
cial portfolios? Not necessarily, as illustrated in gures 2 to 4. Figure 2 shows
the levels of wealth components (nancial assets and endowment wealth), as a
function of total wealth W = ah+e. The thin dashed lines show the case with-
out endowment wealth: nancial assets are approximately linear in wealth, with
a slope equal to their share in the balanced portfolio, determined by return dif-
ferentials, risk aversion and the variance-covariance of aggregate endowments.
18For a given level of total wealth, adding endowment wealth, the thick dotted
line, obviously reduces nancial assets. But importantly, the downward move
in the level of nancial assets is not the same across assets, but determined
by their relative hedging properties against uctuations in endowment income.
The graph shows the situation where VH > VF, so hedging reduces foreign IOU
holdings by more than home IOUs. According to proposition 2, this implies rel-
ative home bias in wealth portfolios, shown in gure 2: wealth portfolio shares
of nancial assets are approximately equal to those without endowment wealth
for very high levels of total wealth, but the share of foreign IOUs decreases faster
as wealth declines and its inferior hedging properties become more important.
However, the behaviour of nancial portfolio shares shown in gure 3 depends
on the behaviour of gross assets. I show a situation where agents with low
but positive net nancial wealth invest only in home IOUs, giving the former a
portfolio share of 1. But this depends on the relative mean returns as well as
the hedging properties. Particularly, for high excess returns on foreign IOUs,
poorer agents will typically rst invest in these despite their inferior hedging
characteristics, leading to an increasing nancial portfolio share of foreign as-
sets as we move down the wealth distribution. Thus, proposition 3 conditions
on mean returns, determined by many factors that my model is not designed
to capture.
Proposition 3
With international trade in IOUs, nancial portfolio shares change across the
wealth distribution. Poorer agents have relative home bias if the volatility of
aggregate home endowments is high enough for the hedging eect to dominate
portfolio decisions. Particularly, in a symmetric equilibrium there is relative
home bias of the poor if credit constraints are more binding abroad.
Proof of proposition 3
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Contrary to the wealth portfolio shares considered in proposition 2, the eect
19of changing relative endowment wealth e e0
h
fin
is determined by the sum of two
terms: the second term is simply the hedge portfolio share we saw before: agents
sell short foreign and home IOUs depending on their relative volatility. But the
rst term describes the increase from investing these short sale proceeds in a
balance investment portfolio. If the balanced portfolio has a large share of for-
eign IOUs because their mean return is higher, this may more than oset their
inferior hedging properties. So portfolios of "poor savers" with low ah may not
have home bias, despite the home bias in the hedge portfolio. Inversely, there
is relative home bias of poorer agents (with a larger e e0
h) whenever either home
volatility is relatively important, giving home agents incentives to hold home
assets for hedging purposes, and / or when the weight of home assets in the
balanced portfolio is large. In either case portfolios change across the wealth
distribution, unless the hedge and balanced portfolio exactly oset each other.
Particularly, we know that in a completely symmetric equilibrium with equal
borrowing limits, returns on IOUs issued by dierent countries must be equal.
If we decrease the relative supply of foreign bonds, e.g. by a tighter borrowing
limit abroad, the equilibrium return on foreign bonds unambiguously falls. Ac-
cording to equation (21), this leads to relative home bias of the poor.
This section has shown the main results of this paper. In my model, the port-
folio share of risky assets declines with wealth. And as long the volatility of
home endowments is high enough to dominate the eect of return dierentials,
nancial portfolio shares of home IOUs also fall with wealth, in line with the
home bias of poor investors found in the data.
6 Aggregate and individual Home Bias
So far, this paper has looked at relative home bias, or the portfolio share of
domestic assets across the wealth distribution. But it turns out that the model
I consider creates a one-to-one link between relative home bias of individuals'
portfolios on the one hand and aggregate home bias of country portfolios on
the other. For this, we rst need a denition of absolute home "bias", relative to
some "unbiased" aggregate portfolio. The literature oers 2 such benchmarks:
in Finance, actual portfolios are often compared to an optimal hedge portfolio
given the observed payo structure of assets (see e.g. Lewis 1999). The macroe-
conomic literature on the other hand is often concerned with showing that home
bias is an optimal outcome in general equilibrium. Thus, this literature tends
20to dene home bias relative to a more ad hoc benchmark, for example the port-
folio consistent with completely diversied portfolios in all countries, implying
portfolio shares equal to the share of a country's assets in world supply (see
e.g. Van Wincoop and Warnock (2006)). As I am concerned with the impact
of non-diversiable income risk, I take as a benchmark the optimal portfolio of
a nancial investor without future endowment income.
Denition 2: Aggregate home bias
A country portfolio has aggregate home bias if the sum of individuals' gross
holdings of home assets as a share of total gross assets exceeds the home asset
share in the optimal portfolio of a purely nancial investor.
Note that the denition is in terms of gross asset holdings. This is intuitive,
as a country's net holdings of domestic assets is bounded above by 0 (as no
non-domestic agents can issue domestic assets, but domestic agents can sell
their assets abroad). Proposition 4 states that aggregate home bias implies,
and requires, relative home bias of individuals. The intuition comes from g-
ure 4: nancial portfolio shares are monotone in wealth and asymptote to the
balanced portfolio, which equals the benchmark portfolio of a purely nancial
investor without endowment wealth. So when there is relative home bias, the
home asset share of all diversied portfolios is bounded by the unbiased port-
folio of a purely nancial investor from below, which implies aggregate home
bias.13 Equally, relative foreign bias implies aggregate foreign bias. To con-
clude the proof formally, however, we need to show that the portfolio decisions
of constrained agents do not change this intuition, as (21) only holds for un-
constrained agents with an interior portfolio.
Proposition 4: Aggregate and individual home bias
With international trade in IOUs there is relative home bias of poorer house-
holds if and only if the country portfolio has aggregate home bias.
Proof of proposition 4
Only if
According to equation (21), if ( g ah;Fjeh   VH
Vtot) < 0, portfolio shares of home
bonds increase as we move down the wealth distribution. In other words, all
13While the aggregate portfolio share of home bonds is not equal to the average of individual
shares, all portfolios having higher home bias than the balanced portfolio is sucient for
aggregate home bias.
21agents with interior portfolios have more home biased portfolios than the lim-
iting portfolio.
As we move down the wealth distribution, however, at some level of total as-
sets a?
h, foreign assets will be optimally zero. All agents with ah < a?
h are
constrained by the non-negativity of foreign assets. However, this means their
home asset share is simply 1, which strictly dominates that of a diversied lim-
iting portfolio. As I focus on gross asset holdings, I can neglect agents with
negative holdings of home bonds.
If
I prove this by showing the contrapositive. Assume that there is relative for-
eign bias at home. The same reasoning as in the previous section goes through
for unconstrained agents. However, as the home asset share now reaches zero
faster as assets drop, some agents can have positive holdings of foreign bonds
and issue home bonds at the same time. But again, negative holdings of home
bonds do not aect gross asset holdings. So we can simply set the foreign asset
share to 1 for all issuers of home bonds. Again, all individual gross asset shares
are bound by the limiting portfolio share from below. So relative foreign bias
implies no aggregate home bias.
7 Robustness of the results
7.1 International trade in both shares and IOUs
An interesting extension of the above analysis is to look at international trade
of both IOUs and shares. In this case, h's problem is to solve (7) with ah =
ah;H;ah;F;ah;S, subject to ah;H  Bb
H;ah;F  0;ah;S  Bs
H. Using the same
approximation as above, and setting the covariance of aggregate endowments
to zero for simplicity, the wealth portfolio shares are now, for interior portfolios,
g ah;F =
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Again, given the perfect comovement of endowment and shares in terms of
aggregate uctuations, the hedge portfolio is just a short position in mutual
fund shares. So, as before, there is risky asset bias of the poor. To determine
how the share of total foreign assets evolves with individual wealth, we have to
22bear in mind that g ah;S comprises both home and foreign equity. In my model
their individual portfolio weights ^ ah;H;S; ^ ah;F;S are not unique, as their payo
distribution is exactly equal. Assuming that adjusted mean returns to IOUs
are equal and that the fraction of home mutual fund shares is independent of
wealth, it is easy to show that there is relative home bias of the poor in wealth
portfolios whenever there is home bias in mutual fund portfolios. Thus again,
aggregate home bias implies, and requires, individual relative home bias.
7.2 Persistent endowment shares
Above I assumed that idiosyncratic risk is i.i.d. across agents, implying that
having high income today does not have any implications for my expected
future income. It is interesting to examine the consequences of relaxing this
assumption. Note rst that the variance of future endowments is not a direct
argument of the arbitrage equations. Nevertheless, it determines precautionary
savings and thus the size of the portfolio. Second, with i.i.d. endowments, future
expected income is the same for all agents. So higher current income translates
to higher assets and a lower ratio of expected future income to the sum of total
claims e e0
h. This yielded the link between current wealth and portfolio shares of
propositions 1,2 and 3. But of course, if we distinguish agents directly by their
e e0
h, all results of section 5 still hold true. Thus, independently of the structure
of uncertainty, agents with a higher share of future endowments in total wealth
will have a higher portfolio share of domestic and safe assets.
8 Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that, according to the Survey of Consumer Finances,
wealthier US Households invest a higher share of their portfolio in international
assets. This result continues to hold when I take account of the fact that poorer
households are less likely to participate in more sophisticated nancial markets.
Fixed costs of participating in foreign asset markets do not explain the rising
portfolio shares for participants. So I constructed a simple 2 country model with
incomplete markets and income heterogeneity that can account for this nd-
ing. Agents in the model receive stochastic endowments of a country-specic
tradable good which are aected by idiosyncratic and country-specic shocks.
Agents are prevented from access to a complete set of asset markets but can
trade in riskless assets and/or in equity. Assuming log-normal returns, I derived
asset portfolios under alternative assumptions regarding the structure of asset
23markets but maintaining the assumption of no insurance against idiosyncratic
risk.
In this model, terms of trade movements imply that poorer households can
partly insure against income volatility by holding domestic or foreign bonds.
Wealthier investors, whose income share of endowments is less important, care
less about this hedging property than poor investors and therefore hold a more
diversied portfolio. Equally they have lower aversion against equity, which due
to terms of trade movements has real payos that comove perfectly with indi-
vidual endowments. Thus, portfolio shares of equity rise with nancial wealth.
The same holds true for bonds as long as their superior hedging properties are
important enough, relative to e.g. return dierentials.
With regards to policy this study implies that the welfare loss from poorer
households' non-participation in sophisticated nancial markets may be less
important than thought. In future research it would be interesting if this result
also holds in dierent environments. Particularly, one could try to relax the
assumptions of unit-elastic preferences, and explore how the model deals with
shocks to demand, rather than the supply shocks to endowments this study has
looked at.
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2610 Appendix 1: Measurement error in foreign assets
The measure of total foreign asset holdings used in the empirical part of this
study potentially suers at least from two kinds of measurement error. First,
the responses of households to questions on their asset holdings are accurate
only insofar individuals both know the accurate Dollar value of their assets, and
truthfully report it. Since I only look at portfolio investments (in other words
I disregard directly owned foreign companies), market values of investments
are in principle available, and individuals should report their Dollar values at
current exchange rates. This may be a strong assumption not only as individ-
uals might not be aware of up-to-date market values for long-term investments
or exchange rates, but also, for example, if some of them underreport system-
atically o-shore investments used to evade tax payments. In the latter case,
however, the resulting measurement error would tend to dilute the correlation
between wealth and the foreign asset share of the portfolio. So a rejection of
the Null hypothesis of no relation would be less likely in the presence of this
kind of measurement error. To see this, suppose all individuals were to invest
x percent of their foreign asset holdings in unreported oshore vehicles. In
this case, the dierence between true portfolio shares ] atrue and those calculated
from reported asset holdings can easily be shown to be x
1 x(] atrue)(1   ] atrue)
Thus portfolio shares of foreign assets calculated from individual reports are
always smaller than the true shares, and the dierence is greatest for interme-
diate portfolios. As we see foreign asset shares rising from zero to single-digit
percentages in Figure 1, the bias will increase along the wealth distribution.
A second source of measurement error results from the use of average portfo-
lio shares in the imputation of households' indirect foreign asset holdings via
mutual funds. If rich individuals systematically invest in funds with dierent
exposures to foreign assets, this might distort the observed wealth eect on
total foreign assets. But again, this error is likely to dampen the observed re-
lationship between wealth and the portfolio share of foreign assets. To see this,
suppose all individuals have the same portfolio share of mutual funds, but richer
individuals choose funds with a higher (lower) share of foreign assets. Using
average mutual fund portfolios introduces measurement error that is negative
for rich (poor) individuals, positive for poor (rich) individuals. This biases the
wealth eect estimated from observed data towards zero. The bias will be even
stronger when richer individuals also have a higher portfolio share of mutual
funds. So again, we would be less likely to reject the null of no wealth eect on
portfolios in the presence of measurement error, than we would be without it.
2711 Appendix 2: Fixed costs and home bias
This section shows that higher costs of investing in foreign assets alone cannot
explain relative home bias of poorer market participants found in the data.
Consider the 2 period problem of a home investor that receives a stochastic
share e of aggregate home endowment YH, and can invest in home bonds at a
return RH, or foreign assets, yielding RF units of foreign currency for bonds
and RSYF for shares. Assume e;YH;YF are independent log-normal random
variables. To abstract from the general equilibrium terms of trade movements
at the basis of the results in the main text, assume that the exchange rate S,
dened as the price of foreign currency in units of the home currency, is simply
also a mean zero independent log-normal variable. In addition, assume that to
buy a? units of foreign assets, the investor has to pay a cost of K = k0 + k1a?,
i.e. there are xed and proportional costs of investing abroad. The investor's
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where K = 0 if the investor has 0 foreign asset holdings.
The problem can be seen as a two-stage decision. First, the investor determines
the optimal portfolios with and without foreign assets; then she compares ex-
pected utility for both and decides wether or not to hold foreign assets.
For simplicity consider binary portfolios where the investor either invests in
shares or bonds. Given log-normality and independence, and approximating















where lower case letters denote logs and V ars is the variance of the log exchange
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28So optimal portfolios are a function of risk aversion, excess returns and the
variances of payos. But importantly, they do not include individual wealth.
Also, proportional costs simply show up as a proportionate reduction of returns
that aects all portfolios equally. So portfolio do not change with wealth among
participants. Fixed costs on the other hand mean that only investors with
a large enough portfolio diversify into foreign assets, where for investment in
foreign bonds say, the threshold value of total assets is dened as that for which
losses from xed costs exactly oset those from sub-optimal portfolios
E[u(e0   aRb
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12 Appendix 3: Existence and uniqueness of equi-
librium
In section 4, I showed that the equilibrium relative price of goods is indepen-
dent of heterogeneity and the allocation of assets. As long as agents have some
preference for both goods (0 <  < 1), (13) thus describes a non-empty, single-
valued mapping from the two-dimensional space of aggregate endowments into
a market-clearing price. In other words a market-clearing price of goods always
exists and is unique for any combination of YH;YF.
The excess demands for assets are the sum of the quantities solving (7), inte-
grated across the distribution of unconstrained agents in both countries, plus
maximum borrowing multiplied by the measure of constrained agents. For ex-
ample, for Home IOUs, remembering that these can only be issued by Home
agents and that asset quantities are denoted in terms of domestic goods for






















where e denotes the level of current home endowment share that solves the
rst order condition for borrowing at the maximum level Bb
H.
Under nancial autarky, existence of an equilibrium price vector R = (Rb
H;Rs
H)
is easy to prove by a xed point argument. Local uniqueness of both consump-
tion allocation and portfolios can also be shown.
However, global uniqueness is more dicult to prove as individual asset de-
mands are not necessarily monotone in relative returns. Two special cases where
the equilibrium can be shown to be globally unique are when bi = 0, i 2 fb;sg
29(only domestic trade in either bonds, or shares), and either   1 (substitution
eects dominate income eects) or bj = 1 (unconstrained issuance of assets).
This is because with one asset only, total excess demand shows no inter-asset
substitution eects. Then, for  < 1, all individual asset demands, and there-
fore total excess demand for assets, are monotone in returns as the substitution
eect dominates. For  > 1 savers may have decreasing asset demand (as the
income eect dominates). But borrowers' asset demand is always increasing in
returns, with an elasticity higher than that of savers at optimal borrowing levels
as long as everybody faces the same period 2 uncertainty. So if all borrowers
are unconstrained the total excess demand is again upward sloping in returns,
and the equilibrium globally unique. However, even with only one asset, when
a lot of borrowers are constrained, there may be multiple equilibria, as the non-
monotonous asset demands of savers can dominate total excess demand.
With more than 1 asset, possibly traded across countries, the equilibrium is
not generally globally unique. But conditions for global uniqueness can be de-
rived for example by imposing the gross substitution property on the system
of individuals' arbitrage equations. For the analysis here this is not a problem,
however, as I only look at interior portfolios, given an equilibrium vector of re-
turns R. I do not solve for the equilibrium explicitly, which will be a function of
the particular specication of distributions and borrowing constraints in both
countries.
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const AGE COL FIN2 FIN3 FIN4
-2.65 0.000 0.11 1.73 1.20 2.15
0.25 0.0016 0.045 0.27 0.29 0.26
No of obs 4519 Censored: 3378
2(2) 68.00
FIN is the SCF measure of total gross nancial wealth; INCOME the
sum of salaries, wages and income or losses from a professional practice,
business, limited partnership, or farming; AGE the age of the house-
hold head in years; FINx a dummy variable that takes the value 1
when nancial wealth falls in the (weight-adjusted) xth quartile of the
cumulative distribution; and COL a dummy variable that equals 1 if
the head of the household has a college degree. Numbers in italics are
standard errors.
31Figure 1: Portfolio share of total foreign assets (decile average) across the nancial
wealth distribution
32Figure 2: Levels of H and F IOUs as a function of total wealth W.
Without endowment wealth and thus no hedging (thin dashed lines), nancial assets
increase linearly in total wealth from 0. With endowment wealth (thick lines),
nancial asset holdings are necessarily lower at any given level of total wealth. But
foreign IOUs, with inferior hedging properties against endowment risk, are lowered by
more than home IOUs. Below total wealth level w* the short-selling constraint on
foreign assets binds, below e net nancial assets are negative.
Figure 3: Wealth portfolio shares.
Without endowment wealth (thin dashed lines), shares of nancial assets in total
wealth are constant and equal to those of the balanced portfolio. With endowment
wealth (thick lines), portfolio shares converge to the balanced portfolio, with an
initial gap that is larger for foreign IOUs, which have inferior hedging properties
against endowment risk.
Figure 4: Financial portfolio shares of home and foreign IOUs.
Without endowment wealth (thin dashed lines), shares of nancial assets in gross
nancial wealth are constant, equal to those of the balanced portfolio. With
endowment wealth (thick lines), nancial portfolio shares also converge to the
balanced portfolio, but are initially 1 for home IOUs (with superior combined hedging
properties and mean return) and 0 for foreign IOUs (where the short-selling
constraint binds).
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